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1R´ esum´ e : Dans cet article, un manager emprunte des fonds ` a une banque pour les investir dans
une activit´ e de production risqu´ ee pour l’environnement. Il peut d´ ecider de mesures pr´ eventives qui
diminueront ce risque, mesures non observables par les op´ erateurs ext´ erieurs ` a la ﬁrme. De plus, le
manager est prot´ eg´ e par la r` egle de la responsabilit´ e limit´ ee. Dans ce contexte d’actions cach´ ees, nous
montrons que l’´ emission d’obligations convertibles - qui donnent le droit ` a leur d´ etenteur d’´ echanger de
la dette contre des actions, peut am´ eliorer les incitations de la ﬁrme ` a investir en pr´ evention par rapport
` a ce que permet un contrat de dette standard. Ce type de relation entre la ﬁrme et la banque peut ˆ etre
consid´ er´ e comme une alternative, ou un compl´ ement, ` a une l´ egislation environnementale du type de
CERCLA, qui pr´ evaut aux Etats-Unis et qui permet d’´ etendre la responsabilit´ e ﬁnanci` ere d’un sinistre
` a tout op´ erateur de la ﬁrme polluante (une banque par exemple). Nos r´ esultats pourraient ainsi servir
de support de r´ eﬂexion ` a l’´ elaboration d’une l´ egislation environnementale europ´ eenne qui, d’apr` es les
discussions entre pays membres de l’Union, se devrait d’ˆ etre plus stricte que l’actuelle l´ egislation. Nous
obtenons un contrat avec ´ emission d’obligations convertibles quin g´ en` ere plus d’incitations en mati` ere de
pr´ evention que de la dette standard, plus de revenu esp´ er´ e pour la ﬁrme et un niveau de bien-ˆ etre social
esp´ er´ e plus ´ elev´ e. Les implications ´ economiques de nos r´ esultats sont largement discut´ es. Mots-cl´ e
: Risque moral, risque environnemental, pr´ evention, obligation convertible. Classiﬁcation JEL :
Q29, D82, G32.
Abstract: In this paper, a manager borrows external funds in order to invest in production and
also in prevention. The latter action must reduce the environmental risk driven by the activity of the
ﬁrm. Prevention is observable neither by outside lenders nor by institutions such as environmental
agencies for instance. In such a situation, we show that issuing convertible bonds - which permits the
holder to exchange his bonds for a predetermined number of shares of the ﬁrm - from a limited liability
ﬁrm could be a way to improve prevention compared to what can usually be done with standard debt.
Such a relationship between the ﬁrm and the bank might be an alternative, or a complement, to the
CERCLA legislation about extended liability which prevails in the United States and which is often
discussed in Europe as a possible support of a more tightened European environmental legislation. We
obtain an optimal convertible bond contract that induces more prevention and higher expected net
revenues for the ﬁrm than standard debt. The expected social welfare is also improved. Finally, the
economic implications of our ﬁndings are discussed. Key Words: Moral Hazard, Environmental Risk,
Limited Liability, Prevention, Convertible Bond. JEL Classiﬁcation: Q29, D82, G32. 21 Introduction
Consider a manager of a ﬁrm who privately decides preventive measures in order to
reduce the environmental risk driven by his activity; he can hide the chosen level of
prevention to outside lenders. This moral hazard problem is exacerbated if the ﬁrm
is protected by the limited liability rule1 : the manager is not aware by damages that
would be larger than the ﬁrm’s net value. In this context, the manager has no incentive
to adopt the required level of prevention, namely the level that maximizes the expected
social welfare, or that asked by a bank or an insurance company (Pitchford (1995), Boyer
and Laﬀont (1997)). Hence, it is necessary to ﬁnd some incentive and/or regulatory rules
that would induce better prevention.
In that spirit, the legislation CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 1980-1985) was adopted by the Congress of the United
States. In case of bankruptcy of the guilty ﬁrm, it allows the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to prosecute any operator suﬃciently involved in the decisions of the
pollutant ﬁrm - whatever its size, such as banks, in order to recover the money engaged
for the clean-up of polluted sites and for the victims’ compensation2. It was expected
that banks enforce ﬁrms to take adequate preventive actions, through the supply of
suitable ﬁnancial contracts. Moreover, CERCLA made it possible to get more available
funds for clean-up and compensation.
For several years, the European Commission works on the possibility of adopting an
environmental legislation which content would be inspired by the CERCLA legislation3.
Besides, the Commission is interested in the ﬁnancial guarantees that are or should be
imposed on ﬁrms before starting an activity that presents a risk for the environment4.
1Ex ante the manager is fully responsible for the environmental damage but, ex post, he is held
ﬁnancially liable only up to the ﬁrm’s net value.
2For details about this legislation, see Boyer and Laﬀont (1996) and Anderson (1998).
3See the 1998 working paper of the European Environmental Bureau “Environmental liability in
Europe: Concerning the need for a European Directive on environmental liability”.
4See the 1997 Report to the European Commission by DELPHI International LTD in Association
with Ecologic GMBH.
3Several public or private funds dedicated to the compensation of victims already exist;
they are ﬁnanced by the oil industry for oil spills, by the steel sector for water pollution
or by governments. Nevertheless, even with those funds - which cost should be rather
fair because of the small frequency of very high damages (Smets, 1992) -, compensation
and clean-up are often not complete. Such compensation funds should be used only for
damages exceeding the insured level, if insurance has been bought, or for damages that
are not covered at all. But legal procedures are long and complex and in most cases the
value of compensation decided by the legal court or by experts is signiﬁcantly less than
the evaluation made by the victims.
CERCLA seems to be able to solve both ex ante and ex post problems: it should
lead to better prevention and to better compensation in case of a damage. Nevertheless,
several studies show that extended liability as thought by CERCLA might not be a good
solution when information is not perfect between the ﬁrm and its operators. Extended
liability may increase the cost of borrowing and this may lead to less prevention from the
ﬁrm and to underinvestment in positively valued projects (Pitchford (1995), Boyer and
Laﬀont (1997)). Beard (1990), Lipowsky-Posey (1993) and Dionne and Spaeter (2002)
obtain more mitigate results. But one important feature is that extended liability always
deteriorates the solvency of the ﬁrm.
Finally, limited liability and moral hazard do not facilitate the implementation of
adequate prevention as desired by CERCLA. In this paper, we propose an alternative
solution by focusing on a more active position of the bank in its relation with the ﬁrm it
ﬁnances. We show that it is possible to get more prevention and better expected social
welfare, without a deterioration of the ﬁnancial condition of the ﬁrm by considering
convertible bonds instead of standard debt, often used in this literature.
A convertible bond is a bond with the added feature that its holder has the option
to turn the bond back to the ﬁrm in exchange for a speciﬁed number of shares of the
ﬁrm. It is well known that this claim can mitigate the incentives to take risk and reduce
the agency costs between bondholders and stockholders (see Barnea, Haugen and Senbet
(1980), Green (1984)). Other studies have shown that the issue of convertible bonds is
4well adapted when it is diﬃcult to estimate asset risk (Brennan and Schwartz (1988))
or when high asymmetric information makes a stock issue unattractive (Stein (1992)).
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that American companies issuing convertible bonds are
riskier than companies issuing straight debt (Lewis, Rogalski and Steward (1999)). In
this paper, we show how this conversion feature may enhance environmental protection
by mitigating the distortionary eﬀects on prevention induced by limited liability and ex
ante moral hazard. If the conversion option remains unexercised, the cash redemption
is lower than the one of a standard debt contract. Hence, the ﬁrm internalizes more
expected marginal beneﬁt of prevention and he has incentives to increase the level of
prevention. On the other hand, if the bank exercises its option, the ﬁrm has to share
proﬁts in good states of nature, that is for low levels of environmental damages. This
characteristic may induce less prevention since the ﬁrm is less concerned by these states.
In fact, we show that there is an optimal contract that induces a positive net eﬀect on
prevention and that also mitigates the negative impact on the ﬁrm’s solvency, which
appears in the standard debt model with extended liability. Moreover we show that this
contract, which is optimal for the ﬁrm, also improves the expected social welfare. In the
last section of the paper, we link the usefulness of such ﬁndings to the implementation of
a European legislation inspired by CERCLA: In which manner, a bank having ﬁnanced
a ﬁrm with convertible bonds could beneﬁt from less severe court decisions in case of
an environmental damage ? For instance, since convertible bonds may induce more
prevention, the underwriting of these securities could be positively interpreted by a legal
court in charge of recovering clean-up and compensation funds.
Besides the environmental dimension we give to this problem of ﬁnancial contract,
another originality of our work lies in the comparison of standard debt with convertible
debt. Indeed, most of the empirical studies that focus on the motivations of issuers (Essig
(1991), Hoﬀmeister (1977), Stein (1992)) show that convertible bonds are often issued
as an alternative to the issuing of common stocks and very seldom as an alternative
to classical bonds. It is often argued that such a behavior might send a good signal
to the market when information is asymmetric between buyers and sellers: holders of
5convertible bonds may beneﬁt from good results of the ﬁrm by exercising the conversion
option and they are also protected against bad results since they do not loose more than
the face value of debt. In our model, the environmental component of the ﬁrms’ activities
may create a new motivation for issuing convertible bonds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy presents the existing results
obtained with standard debt and extended liability. They are used as a benchmark in
Section 3 where the eﬀects of issuing convertible bonds on prevention are investigated.
Section 4 presents some comparative statics and focuses on the solvency of the ﬁrm
and on the social welfare. (In Appendix 6 we compute a parametrized example that
illustrates our results.) Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion on the economic
implications of our results. In particular, we discuss some characteristics of convertible
bonds, not considered in the model, such as callable bonds or sequential conversion for
instance.
2 Standard Debt and Extended Liability
We recall the most interesting results obtained with standard debt. They will be com-
pared in the next section with those related to convertible bonds.
Consider a ﬁrm which needs some external funds in order to start its activity. This
activity yields a random positive proﬁt denoted (X − e y), with X a positive scalar and e y
an environmental risk with realizations in the bounded positive interval [0,T]. The ﬁrm
can make prevention to reduce this risk. Let F(y/e) denote the conditional distribution
of e y, where e is the level of prevention deﬁned on [0,e], with e > 0. The associated
density function is f(y/e). It is reasonable to assume that F displays the ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance property and is convex in prevention: this implies that Fe(y/e) ≥ 0,
Fee(y/e) ≤ 0 and Fe(0/e) = Fe(T/e) = 0. Total investment equals the owner-manager’s
equity E plus the funds B borrowed from a bank. Besides, prevention is considered as
a non monetary eﬀort5 which opportunity cost φ(e) satisﬁes φ
0(e) > 0 and φ
00(e) > 0.
5For a model where e is ﬁnanced out of the borrowed funds, see Dionne and Spaeter (2002).
6In this section we assume that a standard debt contract6 is signed between the bank
and the owner-manager of the ﬁrm. The face value of debt is D, with D ≡ D(B,E).7
Besides, we have e ≡ e(D); the level of prevention chosen by the ﬁrm is aﬀected by the
cost of borrowing.
The proﬁt X−y is common knowledge - it can be publicly announced by a court, but
the level of prevention e is not observable by the bank: we have to cope with an ex ante
moral hazard problem. If the environmental damage is very large the ﬁrm’s assets may
not be suﬃcient for compensation and clean-up and the ﬁrm is pushed into bankruptcy.
We also assume that the ﬁrm is always solvent when no damage occurs. Formally, this
means that the maximum possible proﬁt X is less than T, but larger than D. This
last assumption permits us to isolate the impact of the environmental risk on the ﬁrm’s
behavior.
Both the bank and the owner–manager are risk-neutral8. Thus it is possible to analyze
the willingness of the manager to pay for prevention because of ﬁnancial incentives and
not because of his attitude towards risk. Moreover the ﬁrm is protected by the limited
liability rule: the manager is responsible ex ante for the total amount of damage he can
create but, ex post, compensation and clean-up costs he pays cannot be higher than the
ﬁrm’s net value. Formally, there exists a level of damage b y in ]0,T[ such that the net
revenue r(y) of the manager, equal to the proﬁt minus the cost of borrowing, is nil for
any damage equal to or higher than b y: r(y) = X−y−D > 0 if y < b y, and zero otherwise.
Thus b y ≡ b y(D) and the ﬁrm’s probability of bankruptcy is 1 − F(b y(D)/e).
6Cf. Innes (1990), Dionne and Viala (1994), Chiesa(1992) or, more recently, Coestier(2000) for an
analysis of the optimal capital structure under moral hazard.
7The level of equity E is ﬁxed at its optimal value at the beginning of the activity, knowing that
a standard debt contract is signed. Consequently, with E constant we can normalize its opportunity
cost to zero. The optimal structure has been addressed in a diﬀerent context by Calcagno (2001), who
considers moral hazard between a manager (the agent), in charge of the production process, and an
inside shareholder (the principal).
8Actually, Sappington (1983) shows that considering limited liability of a risk-neutral agent is such as
having to deal with a risk averse individual since all the risk cannot be transferred to him at optimum.
7Due to the environmental legislation, the bank is reimbursed by the ﬁrm only after
victims have been compensated in case of an environmental damage. Moreover, the
ﬁnancial contracts oﬀered by the bank to the ﬁrm must yield an expected net revenue
equal to what it would have obtained by buying risk-free assets for an amount B. Hence,
the participation constraint of the bank is
B(1 + i) = DF(b y(D)/e) +
X+l Z
b y
(X − y)f(y/e)dy − l(1 − F(X + l/e)), (1)
where i is the risk-free interest rate and l the level of extended liability. If l is equal
to zero (to T −X), no (full) responsibility is extended to the bank. For any level between
0 and T − X the bank’s liability is only partial.
Finally, the decision timing is as follows. The ﬁrm asks for external funds B to the
bank, which decides the level of face value D the ﬁrm will have to reimburse. Then
the manager chooses the level of prevention e that maximizes his expected net revenue.
At the end of the period, the environmental risk is realized and proﬁts are observed.




(X − y − D)f(y/e)dy − φ(e), (2)
with respect to e and subject to (1). We denote eP the optimal solution to this
program.
If information would be perfect, a regulator would deﬁne eS as the level of prevention
that maximizes the expected social welfare. It is equal to the expected net revenue of
the manager, minus the expected net loss of the victims, knowing that the expected net
proﬁt of the bank is nil9. Taking into account the zero net proﬁt constraint of the bank,
9This gives
WS = R −
T Z
X+l
yf(y/e)dy + X (1 − F(X + l/e)).





(X − y)f(y/e)dy − B(1 + i) − φ(e). (3)
Lemma 1 hereafter summarizes the respective ﬁrst order conditions.










Proof. See Appendix 1. Both second order conditions are satisﬁed. 
In both expressions in Lemma 1, the left-hand-side term is the expected marginal
beneﬁt of prevention and the right-hand-side term is the expected marginal cost. Notice
that the full internalization of the marginal beneﬁt in the social case is reﬂected by the
integration on the whole interval [0,T], while partial internalization of this eﬀect in the
private case explains why it is only evaluated on the states of nature relevant for the
ﬁrm, namely on [0,b y]. While the marginal cost remains identical in both cases partial
private internalization yields a lower private expected marginal beneﬁt of prevention.
This means that prevention becomes relatively more expensive for the manager than for
the regulator and, consequently, he will choose a private level of prevention lower than
the socially optimal one.
As discussed in the introduction, when the legislation CERCLA was adopted by the
American congress, the objective was to induce more preventive behaviors for ﬁrms,
knowing that limited liability creates some distortionary eﬀects10. Nevertheless, the ex-
isting conclusions about the theoretical eﬀects of extended liability on prevention are
mitigated (Beard (1990), Lipowsky-Posey (1993), Pitchford (1995), Boyer and Laﬀont
(1997), Gobert and Poitevin (1998), Dionne and Spaeter (2002)). In our simple model,
10Recall that limited liability induces only partial internalization of the environmental risk by ﬁrms.
Thus prevention of those risks becomes less worthy for them.
9we obtain that extended liability under moral hazard always yields a lower level of pre-
vention than that we would obtain without CERCLA. Actually, when the bank becomes
potentially liable, it transfers part of this additional cost to the ﬁrm by increasing the
face value of debt. This increase in the cost of borrowing implies that the ﬁrm invests
less in prevention. We also obtain that extended liability associated with standard debt
always leads to a deterioration in the ﬁnancial situation of the ﬁrm. All these results are
developed in Appendix 2.
In the following section we show how issuing convertible bonds may mitigate these
negative eﬀects.
3 Convertible Bonds and Prevention
First we present the model. Second we show that it exists convertible bond contracts
(CB contracts in the course of the text) that improve the prevention level compared to
standard debt. Lastly we characterize the contracts, among those oﬀered by the bank,
that lead to more prevention and to more expected net revenue for the ﬁrm.
3.1 The Model
Instead of standard debt, assume the ﬁrm decides to issue b convertible bonds for a total
face value equal to DC. Because holders of convertible bonds gain the upside potential
of common stocks while actually holding a less risky asset, DC has to be lower than
D. Otherwise, the owner-manager will never have an interest in issuing these assets.
Condition DC < D may be considered as a participation constraint of the ﬁrm. Still
assume that there is only one bondholder, namely the bank, and that each convertible
bond can be exchanged for n shares.11
11Our principal aim is to compare straight debt with convertible bonds, rather than looking at the
optimal capital structure. For such a discussion, we refer to Robe (1999 and 2002) who shows that
convertible securities are a key component of the optimal capital structure when the agent (here the
manager) is risk averse (Robe (1999)) or, alternatively, when limited liability holds (Robe (2002)) such
10The manager holds m initially outstanding shares. They correspond to E, deﬁned as
the owner-manager’s equity in the previous section. The bank will exercise its option if
this action is more proﬁtable than not exercising12 that is, if the percentage of proﬁts it
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If the level y of the environmental damage pushes the ﬁrm into bankruptcy, the bank
will not exercise its option and the net revenue of the manager is zero because of the
limited liability rule. Conversely, we assume that it is proﬁtable for the bank to exercise
if no damage occurs13. Since rC is continuous in y, there exists a level yC of damage such
that it is proﬁtable for the bank to exercise if y < yC and it should not leave its initial
position if y ≥ yC, with yC ∈ ]0,T[. If we use the notation bn
m+bn = a with14 a ≡ a(DC),




Figure 1 displays such a contract. We also represent the standard debt contract with
face value D, where b y is the minimum level of damage that induces bankruptcy with
this contract.
as in our model.
12In our one-period model, the bank is constrained to convert the bonds as one block. We discuss
this assumption and the possibility of sequential conversion in the last section of the paper.
13Otherwise, the basic economic problem stressed in this paper vanishes.
14The number of convertible bonds that are issued is aﬀected by the face value of debt. Actually, the
higher is DC, the lower a: a0(DC) < 0. This result can be obtained thanks to a total diﬀerentiation of
the participation constraint (8) of the bank.
11Figure 1 about here
We denote b yC the level of damage that induces bankruptcy with a CB contract:
X − D
C − b y
C = 0 (6)
Since DC < D, we also have b yC > b y. The crossing point A on Figure 1 reﬂects the
participation constraint of the bank. It will accept to participate if the diminution of its
net revenue in the states of nature where it does not exercise, compared to the standard
debt contract case, is at least compensated by a larger revenue in the states where it
exercises. Hence for y = 0, we must have aX > D, and this implies that rC(0) < X −D
with rC(0) = (1 − a)X.
Finally, the manager has to decide which convertible bond contract (a,DC) and which
level of prevention e maximize his expected net revenue knowing that the risk-neutral
bank oﬀers contracts that satisfy its participation constraint. Formally, the optimization




C = (1 − a)
yC Z
0
(X − y)f(y/e)dy +
b yC Z
yC
(X − y − D
C)f(y/e)dy − φ(e) (7)
subject to
B(1 + i) = a
yC Z
0









(X − y)f(y/e)dy (8)
Green (1984) shows that issuing warrants instead of standard debt induces a less
risky behavior from the manager. He has incentives to select less risky projects because
proﬁts in good states of nature will be shared with the new stockholder after exercise,
while bad states of nature still lead to zero revenue for him because of the limited liability
12rule: high proﬁts, possible with risky projects, are less attractive. Since the properties
of convertible bonds are similar to those of warrants15, we should obtain this incentive
eﬀect with convertible bonds. In fact, two opposite eﬀects on prevention appear.
3.2 Impact on Prevention
Program (7)-(8) is divided in two steps. First, the ﬁrm evaluates the optimal preventive
strategy for each ﬁnancial contract proposed by the bank, including standard debt. The
bank cannot observe the chosen strategy, so that it cannot build a contract contingent on
the level of prevention. Nevertheless, since it knows the distribution of the environmental
risk, it is able to take the strategy of the ﬁrm into account when choosing which ﬁnancial
contract it will propose to the manager. Hence the bank knows that a given contract
(a,DC) will induce a strategy e∗(a,DC) from the ﬁrm. Thus it must list the contracts
(a,DC) that satisfy its participation constraint, knowing the forthcoming behavior of the
ﬁrm. Finally, the manager observes these contracts and chooses the one that maximizes
his expected net revenue. More formally, the ﬁrm seeks the optimal path e∗ for each
contract (a,DC) with a ≡ a(DC) between 0 and 1: We obtain a function e∗(DC). Then
e∗(DC) is substituted in Program (7)-(8), which is solved with respect to DC this time:
Which ﬁnancial contract, among those oﬀered by the bank, maximizes the manager’s
expected net revenue knowing his forthcoming optimal preventive decision e∗(DC)?













for any given ﬁnancial contract (a,DC).
Proof. See Appendix 3. 
15A convertible bond contract gives the right to the holder to exchange bonds for shares, while
warrants permit him to buy new shares at a predetermined price.
13The second order conditions are also satisﬁed. Two eﬀects appear explicitly in (9).
On the one hand, when the bank purchases convertible bonds, it has to pay for the
conversion option, compared to classical bonds, and this feature leads to a reduction
in the cost of borrowing paid by the ﬁrm. Consequently, this improves the ﬁnancial
condition of the ﬁrm, decreases the probability of bankruptcy and induces more private
internalization of the expected marginal beneﬁt of prevention: Now, it is evaluated on

0,b yC
instead of [0,b y]. On the other hand, the fact that the ﬁrm has to share the
highest levels of proﬁts with the bank, if it exercises, makes these good states relatively
less attractive to the ﬁrm and prevention, done in order to increase the chances to be
in those states, becomes less valuable. Hence this second (negative) eﬀect on prevention
may counterbalance the ﬁrst one. Both eﬀects appear on Figure 1 ; The fact that,
on

X − b yC,X − yC
, the ﬁrm’s net revenue in the CB case is higher than the one
obtained when standard debt is issued reﬂects the positive impact of convertible bonds
on prevention. The negative eﬀect on prevention explains the reduction in the shape of




compared to the standard debt case,
where the shape equals one. In Proposition 1 hereafter, we show that there exists a set
of CB contracts inducing a positive net eﬀect on prevention.
Proposition 1 There exists a level of face value DC strictly less than D such that,




, the ﬁrm has suﬃcient
incentives to do more prevention than with a standard debt contract.
Proof. See Appendix 4. 




mitigates the distortionary eﬀects on prevention in-
duced by limited liability and ex ante moral hazard. Proposition 1 also implies that
the bank should not be too much involved in the activity of the ﬁrm. Indeed, with a
increasing when DC decreases, the bank should not own a large percentage of the capital
after having exchanged its bonds for shares. In this manner the manager has not to
share too much of the proﬁts in the good states of nature and he keeps incentives to
do prevention. Still notice that empirical observations suggest that ﬁrms, when issu-
14ing convertible debt, are reluctant to dilute stockholders’ ownership. For instance, the
french legislation allows current stockholders to have priority to underwrite new issues
of convertible bonds up to an amount which would keep the capital structure unchanged
if these bonds were converted.
Until now, we have focused on the conditions that are suﬃcient for observing more
prevention. But even if those contracts exist, we must be sure that they are accepted by
the bank. We must also be sure that one of them is chosen by the ﬁrm. In other words,





exist one that maximizes the expected net revenue of the ﬁrm and is oﬀered by the bank
? The properties of the contract(s) preferred by the ﬁrm are summarized in Lemma 3
hereafter.









(X − y)f(y/e∗)dy −
 
F(b yC/e∗) − F(yC/e∗)

, DC∗ belongs
to ]0,D[ if dRC
dDC is nil and equals zero if this ratio, evaluated at DC∗ = 0, is negative.
ii) Straight debt is never optimal.
Proof. Point i) corresponds to a standard discussion on the ﬁrst order conditions
when the solution must belong to a bounded interval. dRC









DC with RC deﬁned by (7), RC
e equal
to zero at optimum and RC
b yC equal to zero by deﬁnition of b yC. The concavity of RC
with respect to DC is not a well established result in our model. But, RC is a concave
function of e, which is a function of DC. From the combination of functions, we can
conclude that e∗ concave in DC leads to RC concave in DC. Although we are not able
to show that e∗ is concave in DC, we have shown that de
dDC equals zero at DC = DC,
with DC in ]0,D[, is decreasing between DC and D and its slope at DC = 0 is strictly
positive. Under these properties, it is not unreasonable to assume that e displays a unique
maximum, which is DC and, consequently, that this property is also met for RC, since
RC is concave in e. Point ii) is obtained by noticing that DC∗ = D if dRC
dDC |DC∗=D ≥ 0.
15But dRC
dDC(D) = −F(b y/e∗) : it is always negative, so that standard debt is never an
optimum. 
Lemma 4 hereafter is useful to analyze the contracts proposed by the bank.
Lemma 4 The CB contracts that satisfy the participation constraint of the bank, know-




















dDC = 0, (10)
with dRC
dDC deﬁned in Point i) of Lemma 3.
Proof. Equation (10) is obtained by diﬀerentiating the participation constraint (8)
































dDC = 0 (11)
By noticing that the ﬁrst term of the left-hand-side in (11) is minus dRC
dDC deﬁned in
Lemma 3, Lemma 4 is demonstrated. 
Finally, by considering simultaneously Lemmas 3 and 4 , and by focusing only on




-, we are able to
propose the following discussion. The term into brackets in (10) is always positive, so
that DC∗ must be such that a variation in its neighborhood induces the same kind of
eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s expected net revenue and on its preventive strategy: dRC
dDC and de
dDC
must have the same sign. Knowing that de
dDC is negative for the CB contracts we are
interested in, we conclude that the contracts proposed by the bank are such that dRC
dDC
16is negative or nil. With RC concave in DC by assumption, we deduce from Point i) of
Lemma 3 that the ﬁrm will choose the CB contract with the smallest possible face value








is oﬀered by the bank,
then it will be chosen by the ﬁrm. We summarize our results in Proposition 2 hereafter.
Proposition 2 Assume that a solution to Program (7)-(8) exists. Also restrict the




. The ﬁrm will choose the con-
vertible bond contract with the smallest possible face value among those oﬀered by the
bank.
This optimal strategy leads to a level of prevention e∗(DC∗) which is the highest pos-
sible level among those induced by the admissible ﬁnancial contracts.
Finally, issuing convertible bonds may lead to more prevention and this strategy
is optimal for both the ﬁrm and the bank. Thus we expect that convertible bonds
also improve the ﬁnancial condition of the ﬁrm compared to straight debt. And if this
property is met, convertible bonds combined with prevention still should improve the
expected social welfare. Recall that it is the main objective of a regulator, who seeks to
establish socially optimal environmental behaviors. These points are investigated in the
following section.
4 Solvency of the ﬁrm and social welfare
In Subsection 3.2. we have shown that the lower face value of debt displayed by a
convertible bond contract induces more internalization of the expected marginal beneﬁt
of prevention. We can also expect that, for a given amount of investment, bankruptcy
has less chances to occur if borrowing becomes cheaper. Nevertheless, we have to keep in
mind that prevention expenses diﬀer depending on the nature of the ﬁnancial contract.
(Lemma 1 shows that prevention may increase or decrease when substituting convertible
bonds for straight debt.) Prevention does aﬀect the loss distribution and, consequently,
the distribution of proﬁts. Thus we have to cope with two eﬀects when studying the
17impact of convertible bonds on the ﬁrm’s probability of bankruptcy. In Proposition 3
hereafter we are able to conclude about the total eﬀect.





probability of bankruptcy is lower than that prevailing with a standard debt contract.
Proof. The probability of bankruptcy equals 1 − F(b yC/e). We have:
d(1 − F(b yC/e))
dDC = f(b y








, we conclude that this





Now, we have to answer to the following important question: do the beneﬁts for
the society induced by higher levels of prevention at least counterbalance the cost of
implementing these higher levels ? In other words, are convertible bonds a good way
to improve the welfare of the society knowing that moral hazard and limited liability
induce private sub-optimal behaviors in terms of environmental risk reduction?
When the owner-manager privately chooses the level of prevention, the expected
social welfare is:
W
C = (1 − a)
yC Z
0
(X − y)f(y/e)dy +
b yC Z
yC





yf(y/e)dy + X (1 − F(X/e)) (12)
Equation (12) is obtained by recalling that the expected net proﬁt of the bank is
nil and that victims are fully compensated up to the gross proﬁts X of the ﬁrm. The
last term in (12) illustrates the fact that, for any environmental damage higher than X,
victims receive the ﬁxed amount X.
Proposition 4 In optimum, issuing convertible bonds improves the expected social wel-
fare compared to standard debt.
18Proof. See Appendix 5. 
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that convertible bonds never lead to a level of
prevention equal to the optimal social one. The result is immediate when comparing the
social ﬁrst order condition given in Lemma 1 to the private one (9). Convertible bonds
do not make it possible to internalize all the expected marginal beneﬁt of prevention.
Even if the ﬁrm’s probability of being solvent increases, it looses nothing in the worst
states, where the environmental damage may be very high.
Before concluding this paper with economic and managerial considerations, we invite
the reader to refer to Appendix 6 for a parametrized example. We obtain a convert-
ible bond contract that yields more prevention, a lower face value of debt and a higher
expected net revenue for the bank. Besides, this contract satisﬁes the participation con-
straint of the bank, so that it belongs to the available ﬁnancial contracts. And with
these properties, it improves the expected social welfare compared to the standard debt
contract.
5 Discussion
A ﬁrm whose activity is potentially risky for the environment may not choose the socially
optimal level of prevention because of the moral hazard problem and partial internaliza-
tion of environmental damages. Earlier studies have investigated whether the legislation
CERCLA could give ﬁrms suﬃcient incentives to enhance environmental prevention.
Actually, extended liability can, in some situations, induce still less prevention and it
always generates a deterioration of the ﬁnancial condition of the ﬁrm.
In this paper we have explored the economic rationale for the use of convertible bonds
by such a ﬁrm. We have shown that there exist convertible debt contracts that satisfy
the lender participation constraint and increase both prevention and the ﬁrm’s expected
welfare. Furthermore, they make it possible to increase the expected social welfare even
if the actions of the manager are not perfectly observable.
19On one hand, the conversion right component gives the lender a mechanism by which
he can beneﬁt from high levels of prevention and future capital appreciation thus reducing
the underinvestment problem. This implication ﬁts well with the fact that convertible
bonds may be useful when it is diﬃcult to evaluate asset risk as reported by Brennan
and Schwartz (1988). It also implies that the lender may take a more active role when
monitoring the ﬁrm’s expenses. On the other hand, lower interest payment involves
that lower output are internalized. The manager’s welfare becomes sensitive for a larger
range of environmental expenses. These beneﬁts are not outweighed by the lender’s
opportunity to get ﬁrm’s equity because the former still has got the highest stake as
speciﬁed in the optimal convertible bond contract.
Finally, it might be interesting to associate the issue of convertible bonds with a
potential extended liability of banks in the reﬁnement of the environmental legislation,
rather than considering it as an alternative to extended liability. For instance, the issue
of such securities could send a positive signal related to the willingness of the ﬁrm to pay
for prevention. Despite the fact that banks cannot enforce ﬁrms to choose high levels
of eﬀort, they can ask them to split the funds required for their activity into debt and
convertible bonds. Such a behavior could be positively interpreted by a legal court in
charge of recovering funds for clean-up and compensation if an environmental damage
would have occurred.
So far, we did not specify anything about the size of the ﬁrm. However, we assumed
that the ﬁrm’s probability to be pushed into bankruptcy by a court following an en-
vironmental damage is strictly positive. Hence, the model developed here deals more
speciﬁcally with small and mediums ﬁrms for which the available assets are likely to
be insuﬃcient for comprehensive compensation. It has been shown elsewhere that con-
vertible bonds are well suited for young and high growth ﬁrms in the context of capital
venture (see for instance Gompers (1993) and Biais and Casamatta (1999)). When the
activity of this kind of ﬁrms is also risky for the environment, our rationale could be an
additional incentive to issue convertible bonds.
20In our one period model, it is not possible to focus on what happens if no environ-
mental damage occurs. If those accidents may have a huge magnitude and catastrophic
consequences, the probability of occurrence for a given ﬁrm is rather low. Thus, one can
expect that most convertible bondholders of fast growing ﬁrms convert their bonds very
quickly. Bascha and Waltz (2001) show that these securities are adequate to facilitate
exit solutions through IPOs or trade sales in the venture capital industry where investors
have to free capital for other investments. So, one could argue that the control of in-
vestments in prevention described in this paper is weakened since the convertible bonds
are converted within a few years. However, the CERCLA legislation concerns banks.
This kind of investors oﬀer long term contracts to the ﬁrms they ﬁnance. In the case
of convertible bonds, banks will ask for high conversion premium per share in order to
lower the conversion probability in the ﬁrst years following the issue. Moreover, even
if no environmental damage occurs during several years and thus conversion become
attractive, they may still have an interest to keep their convertible bonds and not to
exercise their option. Control still holds. Later on, when the contract between the ﬁrm
and the bank ends up, the ﬁrm may want to modify its capital structure, to invest in
new activities or to diversify them, to increase its size, etc. This may motivate the issue
of new convertible bonds and preventive incentives reappear.
Empirical observation shows also that most convertible bonds have embedded call
option. This option gives the issuer the right to call the issue prior to the expiration date.
This may force the bank to convert its bonds if an announcement of early redemption is
made since the underlying share is likely to be worth much more than the redemption
value. Hence, still here, we could have to cope with a problem of incentives : proﬁts are
shared between the ﬁrm and the bank and the former has no longer incentives to invest
more in prevention than with standard debt. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of the call option
is mitigated by the call protection covenant which does not permit redemption in the
early years.
A next step would be to sophisticate the model by introducing a second period. In
21particular, this would permit the bank to convert sequentially its bonds into shares.
What would be the impact of this sequential conversion on the prevention incentives?
One intuition would be to say that less prevention will be implemented because the
risk neutral bank becomes the owner of part of the ﬁrm. On the other hand, more
prevention can be decided if the objective of the bank is to convert in order to be able to
inﬂuence the decisions taken by the manager and his team. It would also be interesting
to study the optimal date(s) of conversion for the bank: is sequential conversion really
optimal? One might expect that a one time conversion be the best strategy. The bank
may convert all its bonds at the beginning if it wants to directly inﬂuence the decisions
taken on prevention, or it could wait the end of the contract - when all random variables
are realized - if the shares owned after conversion are not suﬃcient to enter the director
board of the ﬁrm.
Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1.
Diﬀerentiation with respect to (w.r.t.) e of the ﬁrm’s expected net revenue (2) yields
the following ﬁrst order condition:
b y(D) Z
0




Knowing that Fe(0/e) = 0 and X−D−b y = 0, integration by part of the left-hand-side
term w.r.t. y leads to:
e












00(eP), which is negative, so that the second order condition is satisﬁed.










0(eS). Here again, the second order conditions are satisﬁed.
22Appendix 2. Proofs related to Section 2.




dl . This is done in two steps, with the unambiguous notation eP ≡ e.
First, we obtain the following relation thanks to a total diﬀerentiation of the private ﬁrst







The ﬁrm always decreases the level of prevention when borrowing becomes more costly.
Besides, total diﬀerentiation of the participation constraint (1) of the bank w.r.t. D and




1 − F(X + l/e)
F(b y(D)/e)
> 0 for any l in [0,T − X[ (14)
The bank always increases the cost of borrowing if it may be held liable for an envi-
ronmental damage. Equations (13) and (14) make it possible to conclude that extended
liability always leads to a lower private level of prevention than standard debt without
extended liability. Furthermore, it always deteriorates the ﬁnancial condition of the ﬁrm.
Indeed, with (1 − F(b y(D)/e) the ﬁrm’s probability of bankruptcy and b y = X − D we
get












Appendix 3. Proof of Lemma 2.
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Lemma 2 is demonstrated.
Appendix 4. Proof of Proposition 1.
Since, in our simple model, a CB contract can be completely deﬁned by the value
of DC (with a ≡ a(DC)) and because a CB contract displays a lower face value than
standard debt, we have to focus on the variation of prevention following a decrease in the





























































































The denominator of de/dDC is negative, while the sign of the numerator is unde-










This result is obtained because yC tends towards 0 and b yC towards b y (deﬁned in












This result is due to the fact that yC and b yC tend towards X as DC gets closer to
zero. Since de/dDC is continuous in DC, it exists a level DC strictly smaller than D,




and such that de
dDC |DC=DC= 0.
Proposition 1 is demonstrated.
Appendix 5. Proof of Proposition 4.
It is suﬃcient to show that the expected social welfare increases as the face value
of debt decreases when starting from D on. The total derivative with respect to DC of























































































25The sign of (18) is undetermined. But it is possible to conclude when focusing on the




. Indeed, notice that the second
expression in the right-hand-side term of (18) corresponds to minus dRC/dDC, deﬁned









, we obtain that dWS
dDC is




. Proposition 4 is demonstrated.
Appendix 6. Computations for the parametrized example.
Computations have been made with Maple V Release 2. The detailed computation
can be obtained upon request to the authors.
In the ﬁrst paragraph here, we focus on the standard debt model. Then we present
the results obtained with convertible bonds. We show that, from one model to the
other, prevention increases, the face value of debt decreases, the participation constraint
of the bank is satisﬁed, the expected net revenue of the ﬁrm is improved and, ﬁnally,the
expected social welfare is also improved. For both models, we use a distribution function
given by LiCalzi and Spaeter (2002). It satisﬁes the properties needed in many issues of
asymmetric information and, in particular, those assumed for our modelization. Still we
assume the following parameters as given :
X = 10 (gross proﬁts)
y ∈ [0,15] (environmental risk)
e ∈ [0;5,4] (level of prevention)
B = 2 (external funds)
i = 0 (the risk free interest rate is normalized to zero without loss of generality)
l = 0 (no extended liability)
φ(e) = 0,01e2 (the opportunity cost of prevention)






















The parameter k must be such that the density function is well deﬁned. Since e takes
values in [0;5,4] in this parametrization, it is suﬃcient to assume that k = 38.
6.1. Standard debt









































The expected social welfare obtained when the manager privately chooses his level of
prevention is:
W = R −
T Z
X
yf(y/e)dy + X (1 − F(X/e))
Explanations of each term of W are similar to those proposed for W C in the text
(Equ. (12)). With our parameters, we have:




































































































































Recall that the parameter a is a percentage with values in [0,1], which is decreasing
in d. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the relation between a and d is linear
and deﬁned as follows: a(d) = 1 − d
D. With D = 2,4416 obtained with the previous
computation, a(d) equals 1 − d




W C(e∗,d) = 2,6786.
By comparing these results with those obtained just above, we conclude that there
exists a convertible bond contract that yields more prevention (e∗ > eP), a lower face
value of debt (d < D) and a higher expected net revenue for the ﬁrm (RC > R). Besides,
such a contract (a,D) satisﬁes the participation constraint of the bank so that it belongs
to the available contracts. It also improves the expected social welfare (W C > W).
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